Fuel starvation
Air Tindi Ltd.
de Havilland DHC-6-300 Twin Otter, C-GNPS
Fort Providence, Northwest Territories, 6.7 NM NW
The occurrence
At 1748 Mountain Daylight Time on 01 November 2021, the Air Tindi Ltd. de Havilland DHC-6-300 Twin Otter aircraft (registration C-GNPS, serial number 558) departed Yellowknife Airport (CYZF), Northwest Territories, as flight TIN223, a visual flight rules flight to Fort Simpson Airport (CYFS), Northwest Territories, with 2 flight crew and 3 passengers on board.
Approximately 40 minutes into the flight, the flight crew realized that there was insufficient fuel to continue to CYFS or to return to CYZF. The flight crew diverted the aircraft to Fort Providence Aerodrome (CYJP), Northwest Territories, and informed the company of their decision. The left engine was intentionally shut down to conserve fuel. The right engine then flamed out.
A forced landing onto muskeg was performed at 1851 Mountain Daylight Time, 6.7 nautical miles (14 km) northwest of CYJP. A signal from the emergency locator transmitter was received by the Canadian Mission Control Centre shortly after. Approximately 4 hours after the forced landing, all occupants were recovered by rescue personnel. All occupants received minor injuries related to hypothermia. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.
Media materials
News release
2021 forced landing of an aircraft due to fuel starvation highlights the importance of proper checklist usage
Read the news release
Investigation information
A21W0098
Fuel starvation
Air Tindi Ltd.
de Havilland DHC-6-300 Twin Otter, C-GNPS
Fort Providence, Northwest Territories, 6.7 NM NW
Investigator-in-charge
Jonathan (Jon) Lee is the Western Regional Manager for the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) in Edmonton, Alberta. He has been an aircraft investigator since 1999, and has been managing the Edmonton office since 2004. He has been involved in approximately 50 investigations. Mr. Lee has also participated in foreign investigations that involve Canadian aerospace products. Working with the National Transportation Safety Board (United States), the Aviation Safety Council (Taiwan), Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (South Korea), and the Aviation Accident Investigation Board (Mongolia) has made Mr. Lee appreciate the importance of the TSB’s role in global aviation.
Before working in accident investigation, Mr. Lee gained industry experience as a pilot in operations ranging from regional airlines and transcontinental cargo to medevac and flight instruction. He has flown over 35 types of aircraft and has accumulated 6500 flight hours. He maintains a valid and current airline transport pilot license.
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Class of investigation
This is a class 3 investigation. These investigations analyze a small number of safety issues, and may result in recommendations. Class 3 investigations are generally completed within 450 days. For more information, see the Policy on Occurrence Classification.
TSB investigation process
There are 3 phases to a TSB investigation
- Field phase: a team of investigators examines the occurrence site and wreckage, interviews witnesses and collects pertinent information.
- Examination and analysis phase: the TSB reviews pertinent records, tests components of the wreckage in the lab, determines the sequence of events and identifies safety deficiencies. When safety deficiencies are suspected or confirmed, the TSB advises the appropriate authority without waiting until publication of the final report.
- Report phase: a confidential draft report is approved by the Board and sent to persons and corporations who are directly concerned by the report. They then have the opportunity to dispute or correct information they believe to be incorrect. The Board considers all representations before approving the final report, which is subsequently released to the public.
For more information, see our Investigation process page.
The TSB is an independent agency that investigates air, marine, pipeline, and rail transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.