Associated links (M20A0434)
Speaking Notes - M20A0434 (Chief William Saulis)
Check against delivery.
Introduction - Kathy Fox
Good morning everyone and thank you for joining us.
Today we are here to outline our investigation findings following the 2020 sinking of the scallop boat Chief William Saulis, leaving one deceased and five crew members still classified as missing. Our continued thoughts and condolences are with those who lost their loved ones and were impacted by this tragic accident, including members of the Annapolis Valley First Nation.
In addition to explaining what the investigation found, the Board is issuing a recommendation with regards to Transport Canada’s regulatory surveillance of safety procedure documentation available to crews to help ensure fish harvesters have access to important, potentially lifesaving information.
To begin, I will turn things over to Pearse Flynn.
Accident summary – Pearse Flynn
Thank you, Kathy.
On December 15, 2020, shortly after midnight Atlantic Standard Time, the scallop boat Chief William Saulis with six crew members onboard, departed the fishing grounds in Chignecto Bay , New Brunswick, to return to port in Digby, Nova Scotia.
Shortly after 5:50 am, the vessel’s emergency position-indicating radio beacon activated, 12 nm off the coast of Digby. Search and rescue deployed and recovered the body of one crew member approximately ten and a half hours later. He was not wearing any lifesaving equipment.
The vessel was eventually located a month later near Delaps Cove, Nova Scotia. The five missing crew members still have not been found.
Investigation findings – Pearse Flynn
Our investigation identified several key factors that contributed to this accident.
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The Chief William Saulis, like many other fishing vessels, did not have a formal stability assessment in place, so the crew made operating decisions that likely affected the vessel’s stability without sufficient knowledge of the safe operating limits.
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At the time of the occurrence, the crew was sailing with an estimated load of 4300kg of scallops. About 2700kg of this load was unshucked scallops stored on deck in unsecured piles up to 5ft high and in totes and baskets.
Crews will typically shuck scallops on their way back to harbour, however in rough seas they will usually rest inside the vessel and finish the work once in port.
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At the time of the occurrence, weather records and the course of the vessel indicated beam sea conditions, which would have resulted in waves hitting the vessel broadside and breaking across the deck.
- The vessel’s freeing ports, which allow water to drain from the main deck, were likely covered either mechanically or by the unsecured scallops so that water from the heavy beam sea accumulated on deck. The resulting free surface effect created by the rolling motion from the heavy beam sea, accumulated water, and shifting scallops likely caused the vessel to capsize and sink.
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Survivability was significantly affected by the combination of:
- the rate at which the water flooded the vessel and its cold temperature,
- fatigue,
- being woken from sleep,
- the surrounding darkness,
- difficult-to-access escape routes, and
- stress response.
- Finally, while the owner of the Chief William Saulis, Yarmouth Sea Products Limited, had provided all vessels in its fleet with a manual for vessel operations and safety, most of the safety procedures were based on templates provided by Transport Canada. Neither these templates nor the manual for the vessel included all procedures required by regulation. The manual also did not have any written procedures to guide the use of the freeing ports, or for how scallops should be stowed on deck.
Kathy Fox will now talk about the Board’s recommendation.
Recommendations – Kathy Fox
Thank you, Pearse.
Both the Canada Shipping Act, [2001] and the Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations are clear in their requirement that a vessel’s authorized representative – in this case, Yarmouth Sea Products, Ltd. - provide written safety procedures that familiarize vessel crews with operational and emergency activities.
Yet the Transport Canada templates do not include all procedures required by regulation. So, as seen with the Chief William Saulis, many company manuals may be incomplete if based mostly on these templates.
This is an industry-wide issue.
In 2021/2022, Transport Canada conducted a national concentrated inspection campaign on compliance with the Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations, including regulatory requirements for written safety procedures.
They found deficiencies that had not been identified through their certification program and issued deficiency notices to 62% of the 101 vessels inspected.
The largest number of deficiencies were related to vessel and crew safety, with deficiencies related to drills and drill records [41%], the completeness and accessibility of safety procedures [30%], and the crews’ knowledge of safety procedures [28%].
Companies must identify hazards specific to the nature of their operations and assess risks using a guided process, otherwise it will compromise the safety of their crew.
And if the vessel certification process doesn’t identify gaps in safety procedures and provide education, then there is a risk that authorized representatives will allow vessels to operate without effective safe work practices.
As these results demonstrate, the ongoing lack of regulatory oversight means that fishing crews are routinely operating on vessels without even knowing how to stay safe or how to respond when things go wrong.
Therefore, the Board recommends that:
Transport Canada [The Department of Transport] ensures that each inspection of a commercial fishing vessel verifies that each required written safety procedure is available to the crew and that the crew are knowledgeable of these procedures.
Conclusion – Kathy Fox
Commercial fishing is one of the most hazardous occupations in the country, with approximately 11 fish harvesters dying every year.
In 2012, the TSB released an in-depth study on the causes of fatal fishing vessel accidents. The investigation highlighted a number of systemic factors requiring attention, in particular:
- vessel modifications and their impact on stability;
- the lack of, or failure to use, lifesaving equipment, such as PFDs, immersion suits, and emergency signaling devices;
- unsafe work practices;
- and inadequate regulatory surveillance, an issue so pervasive it has been on the TSB Watchlist for 13 years.
It bears repeating that safety is a shared responsibility.
Yet here we are STILL talking about many of the same issues, and another six fish harvesters didn’t make it home from what could have been a preventable accident. How many more people have to be lost at sea before these changes are made?
Thank you.