Safety communications related to TSB investigation M20A0434: December 2020 sinking of the fishing vessel Chief William Saulis
The occurrence
On 15 December 2020, shortly after midnight, the fishing vessel Chief William Saulis, with six crew members on board, departed Chignecto Bay, New Brunswick, to return to port in Digby, Nova Scotia. Shortly after 0550, the vessel’s emergency position-indicating radio beacon activated, 12 nm off the coast of Digby. Search and rescue efforts were initiated after the vessel could not be reached via very high frequency (VHF) radio or phone. The body of one crew member was recovered approximately ten and a half hours after the vessel’s EPIRB activated. The vessel was eventually located a month later near Delaps Cove, Nova Scotia. At December 2022, the other five crew members remained missing.
Safety action required
Regulatory oversight of written safety procedures for fishing vessels
The investigation determined that the vessel departed the fishing grounds with unshucked scallops on deck, and the freeing ports were likely covered either mechanically or by scallops, so that water from the heavy beam sea also accumulated on deck. The resulting free surface effect from shifting scallops and water and the rolling motion from the heavy beam sea likely caused the vessel to capsize and sink.
Both the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and the Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations (FVSR) require a vessel’s authorized representative (AR) to provide written safety procedures that familiarize persons on board with various operational and emergency activities. Yarmouth Sea Products Limited (YSP), the AR for the Chief William Saulis, had provided the Chief William Saulis and the other 24 vessels in the YSP fleet with a manual for vessel operations. Most of the safety procedures in the manual were based on templates provided by Transport Canada (TC). However, these templates do not cover all required procedures, and the manual did not include all procedures required by regulation. In particular, the manual did not have any written procedures to guide the use of the freeing ports, or for how scallops should be stowed on deck, 2 elements critical for the stability of the Chief William Saulis. The investigation determined that, if guidance provided by TC for written safety procedures required by the FVSR, including templates, only partially covers regulatory requirements for effective safety procedures, there is a risk that organizations will not develop complete written safety procedures.
For fishing vessels such as the Chief William Saulis, TC’s certification program is the primary oversight mechanism to ensure compliance with regulations. Although written safety procedures are required by regulation, TC does not require them to be approved, does not verify their content during inspections, and does not determine if the crew are knowledgeable about the procedures.
TC inspection records indicate that from July 2017 to December 2020, 84 separate inspections were conducted on the 25 vessels operated by YSP. None of the records indicated any deficiencies relating to the vessels’ safety procedures. The investigation found that, if the vessel certification process does not identify gaps in safety procedures and provide education, there is a risk that masters, owners, and others filling the role of AR will allow vessels to operate without effective safe work practices.
Concentrated Inspection Campaigns (CICs) are one form of TC oversight that is independent of the regular certification program. In these campaigns, TC focuses on a specific area of safety concern for Canadian vessels. In 2021/2022, TC conducted a CIC that focused on fishing vessels and especially on compliance with the FVSR, including regulatory requirements for effective safety procedures. The CIC found deficiencies that had not been identified through TC’s certification program and issued deficiency notices to 62% of the 101 vessels inspected. The largest number of deficiencies were related to ensuring the safety of vessel and crew: vessels had deficiencies related to drills and drill records (41%), the completeness and accessibility of safety procedures (30%), and the crews’ knowledge of safety procedures (28%).
TC’s oversight is not always effective, and so the issue of regulatory oversight remains on the TSB Watchlist 2022.
Without TC oversight to validate that the written procedures required by regulation on board fishing vessels have been developed and that crew are knowledgeable of their content, there is a risk that fishing operations will continue without guidance critical to support the safety of the crew and the vessel. Therefore, the Board recommends that
the Department of Transport ensure that each inspection of a commercial fishing vessel verifies that each required written safety procedure is available to the crew and that the crew are knowledgeable of these procedures.
TSB Recommendation M23-05
Safety communications related to TSB investigation M20A0434: December 2020 sinking of the fishing vessel Chief William Saulis
The occurrence
On 15 December 2020, shortly after midnight, the fishing vessel Chief William Saulis, with six crew members on board, departed Chignecto Bay, New Brunswick, to return to port in Digby, Nova Scotia. Shortly after 0550, the vessel’s emergency position-indicating radio beacon activated, 12 nm off the coast of Digby. Search and rescue efforts were initiated after the vessel could not be reached via very high frequency (VHF) radio or phone. The body of one crew member was recovered approximately ten and a half hours after the vessel’s EPIRB activated. The vessel was eventually located a month later near Delaps Cove, Nova Scotia. At December 2022, the other five crew members remained missing.
Safety action required
Regulatory oversight of written safety procedures for fishing vessels
The investigation determined that the vessel departed the fishing grounds with unshucked scallops on deck, and the freeing ports were likely covered either mechanically or by scallops, so that water from the heavy beam sea also accumulated on deck. The resulting free surface effect from shifting scallops and water and the rolling motion from the heavy beam sea likely caused the vessel to capsize and sink.
Both the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and the Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations (FVSR) require a vessel’s authorized representative (AR) to provide written safety procedures that familiarize persons on board with various operational and emergency activities. Yarmouth Sea Products Limited (YSP), the AR for the Chief William Saulis, had provided the Chief William Saulis and the other 24 vessels in the YSP fleet with a manual for vessel operations. Most of the safety procedures in the manual were based on templates provided by Transport Canada (TC). However, these templates do not cover all required procedures, and the manual did not include all procedures required by regulation. In particular, the manual did not have any written procedures to guide the use of the freeing ports, or for how scallops should be stowed on deck, 2 elements critical for the stability of the Chief William Saulis. The investigation determined that, if guidance provided by TC for written safety procedures required by the FVSR, including templates, only partially covers regulatory requirements for effective safety procedures, there is a risk that organizations will not develop complete written safety procedures.
For fishing vessels such as the Chief William Saulis, TC’s certification program is the primary oversight mechanism to ensure compliance with regulations. Although written safety procedures are required by regulation, TC does not require them to be approved, does not verify their content during inspections, and does not determine if the crew are knowledgeable about the procedures.
TC inspection records indicate that from July 2017 to December 2020, 84 separate inspections were conducted on the 25 vessels operated by YSP. None of the records indicated any deficiencies relating to the vessels’ safety procedures. The investigation found that, if the vessel certification process does not identify gaps in safety procedures and provide education, there is a risk that masters, owners, and others filling the role of AR will allow vessels to operate without effective safe work practices.
Concentrated Inspection Campaigns (CICs) are one form of TC oversight that is independent of the regular certification program. In these campaigns, TC focuses on a specific area of safety concern for Canadian vessels. In 2021/2022, TC conducted a CIC that focused on fishing vessels and especially on compliance with the FVSR, including regulatory requirements for effective safety procedures. The CIC found deficiencies that had not been identified through TC’s certification program and issued deficiency notices to 62% of the 101 vessels inspected. The largest number of deficiencies were related to ensuring the safety of vessel and crew: vessels had deficiencies related to drills and drill records (41%), the completeness and accessibility of safety procedures (30%), and the crews’ knowledge of safety procedures (28%).
TC’s oversight is not always effective, and so the issue of regulatory oversight remains on the TSB Watchlist 2022.
Without TC oversight to validate that the written procedures required by regulation on board fishing vessels have been developed and that crew are knowledgeable of their content, there is a risk that fishing operations will continue without guidance critical to support the safety of the crew and the vessel. Therefore, the Board recommends that
the Department of Transport ensure that each inspection of a commercial fishing vessel verifies that each required written safety procedure is available to the crew and that the crew are knowledgeable of these procedures.
TSB Recommendation M23-05