ISSN 2561-2247
The original version was signed by
Kathleen Fox
Chair
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
The original version was signed by
The Honourable Karina Gould
Minister of Democratic Institutions and
President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada
Chair's message
2016-17 was a very busy year for the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB). In addition to the many investigations that we began and completed, the TSB launched a new edition of our safety Watchlist and hosted an inaugural safety summit that brought together senior Canadian transportation executives from government and the transportation industry, along with some of their labour organizations. The TSB's senior management team also launched a new Strategic Plan and spent considerable effort looking at how we can improve the way we go about our business—specifically, our processes, products, and training programs. The goal is to better position our organization to meet the challenges and demands of an ever-changing present and an uncertain future, ensuring that the TSB continues to be relevant and effective in fulfilling its mandate to advance transportation safety.
Despite our best efforts, however, performance results for this past year were lower than anticipated, particularly report timeliness. We also faced significant resource pressures, most notably the upcoming retroactive cost of new collective agreements. This has curtailed our ability to make other investments as funds were set aside to cover this liability. Nevertheless, the senior management team has identified improvement strategies and taken steps to turn things around. We therefore expect measurable progress on a number of our performance indicators over the coming years.
Moving forward, the TSB will need to be both strategic and flexible, all while the ground beneath our feet continues to shift at what feels like ever-increasing speed. Fortunately, we have a strong track record when it comes to adapting to change and getting things done. It's what we do here at the TSB—and Canadians should expect no less.
Kathleen Fox
Results at a glance
2016–17 TSB Resource Utilization
Financial: $29,992,744
Human: 214 full-time equivalents
- In 2016-17, the TSB published 44 investigation reports and issued a total of 20 recommendations in the Marine, Rail, and Aviation sectors. Watchlist 2016 was released with two new safety issues and was featured prominently through a proactive outreach campaign. The annual report provides a substantive update on Watchlist issues and related activities.
- Initiatives of particular interest are the first-ever multi-modal TSB Transportation Safety Summit and the completion of the Railway Safety Issue Investigation Report: "Expanding the use of locomotive voice and video recorders in Canada". The Safety Summit, held in April 2016, brought together senior Canadian transportation executives from government and the transportation industry, along with some of their labour organizations, to share best practices—notably for capturing and using safety data in a proactive, non-punitive way—and to identify ways of strengthening organizational safety culture and safety management. The railway safety issue investigation also involved the participation of key railway stakeholders and culminated with the publication of a final report in September 2016. The investigation reviewed some best practices, identified and evaluated implementation issues, examined potential safety benefits of the expanded use of on-board recorders, and collected background information for the development of an action plan to implement locomotive voice and video recorders. It also served as a foundation for legislative changes recently tabled in Parliament.
- Based upon work completed in 2016-17, the Minister of Transport tabled Bill C-49 in Parliament in May 2017. This new legislative proposal includes two key components for the TSB. First, the Bill contains provisions that will require the mandatory installation of voice and video recorders in lead locomotives operating on main track. This will address two long standing TSB recommendations and one Watchlist issue. Secondly, the Bill contains proposed amendments to the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act that will remove the legal barrier preventing companies from using on-board recorders for proactive safety management purposes.
- The department did not spend all of its available resources in order to create a planned lapse and maximize its carry-forward of funds. These funds were set aside to cover two years of retroactive payments to employees once the new collective agreements are ratified and signed.
For more information on the department's plans, priorities and results achieved, see the "Results: what we achieved" section of this report.
Raison d'être, mandate and role: who we are and what we do
Raison d'être
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board is referred to as the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) in its day-to-day activities. The TSB is an independent agency created in 1990 by an Act of Parliament. It operates at arm's length from other government departments and agencies to ensure that there are no real or perceived conflicts of interest. The TSB's sole objective is to advance air, marine, rail and pipeline transportation safety. This mandate is fulfilled by conducting independent investigations into selected transportation occurrences to identify the causes and contributing factors, and the safety deficiencies evidenced by these occurrences. The TSB makes recommendations to reduce or eliminate any such safety deficiencies and reports publicly on its investigations. The TSB then follows up with stakeholders to ensure that safety actions are taken to reduce risks and improve safety.
The TSB may also represent Canadian interests in foreign investigations of transportation accidents involving Canadian registered, licensed or manufactured aircraft, ships or railway rolling stock. In addition, the TSB carries out some of Canada's obligations related to transportation safety at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
The Minister of Democratic Institutions and President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada is the designated minister for the purposes of tabling the TSB's administrative reports in Parliament, such as the Departmental Plan and the Departmental Results Report. The TSB is part of the Privy Council portfolio of departments and agencies.
Mandate and role
The TSB exists as an independent investigation body with the sole goal of advancing transportation safety. Since its inception in 1990, the TSB has conducted thousands of investigations across the transportation modes for which it is responsible and communicated its findings publicly.
As one of the world leaders in its field, the TSB regularly shares its investigation techniques, methodologies and tools with foreign safety organizations by inviting them to participate in in-house training programs in the areas of investigation methodology and human and organizational factors. Under the terms of international agreements, the TSB also provides investigation assistance to foreign safety organizations, such as downloading and analyzing flight recorder data or overseeing engine tear-downs. The TSB also shares data and reports with sister organizations, in addition to participating in international working groups and studies to advance transportation safety.
For more details on the TSB investigation process or the links between the TSB and other federal organizations visit the TSB website.Footnote i
For more general information about the department, see the "Supplementary information" section of this report.
Operating context and key risks
Operating context
The TSB operates within the context of a very large and complex Canadian and international transportation system. Many Canadian and foreign organizations are responsible for, and involved in, improving transportation safety. The TSB does not have any power or authority to direct others to implement its recommendations or to make changes. The Board must therefore present its findings and recommendations in such a manner that compels others to act. This implies ongoing dialogue, information sharing and strategic coordination with many organizations such as Transport Canada, the National Energy Board and the Canadian Coast Guard. The TSB must also engage industry, provincial governments, and foreign regulatory organizations in a similar fashion. Through various means, the TSB must present compelling arguments that will convince these "agents of change" to allocate resources and take action in response to identified safety deficiencies despite their many other competing priorities.
Furthermore, with the increasing globalization of the transportation industry, governments and industry are seeking greater harmonization of policies and practices between countries in order to facilitate cross-border trade, as well as the movement of people and goods. For example, rules that apply to trains that cross the Canada / U.S. border on a daily basis must be harmonized in order to avoid slowing or stopping their movements or creating administrative issues for the companies. This in turn makes the TSB's work more difficult. In order to achieve results (i.e. get safety actions implemented), the TSB can no longer simply engage and convince Canadian stakeholders to act on their own. The TSB must convince both Canadian and foreign stakeholders to take actions in a coordinated and consistent manner.
The TSB's volume of activities is influenced by the number, severity and complexity of transportation occurrences, none of which can be effectively predicted. This uncertainty poses certain challenges with respect to the planning and management of TSB resources. Additionally, over the past few years the TSB's visibility has increased significantly as a result of high-profile occurrence investigations, the TSB's Outreach Program, and the increased use of social media to share safety information. The TSB's enhanced visibility has generated higher stakeholder and public expectations than ever before.
Key risks
The TSB faces key strategic risks that represent a potential threat to the achievement of its mandate. These risks warrant particular vigilance from all levels of the organization.
A significant risk is managing workload and expectations. The TSB cannot predict the volume of activities since these are influenced by the number, severity and complexity of transportation occurrences. The public's expectation is that the TSB will deploy and investigate all serious occurrences, will deliver timely answers on each investigation, and will make a difference in preventing future occurrences. This has resulted in higher expectations relating to the timeliness of the TSB's safety products, the quality of its work, and the number of safety products completed.
The TSB must continue to meet its mandate within a limited budget, and any further spending cuts or budget freezes could put the integrity of its program at risk. While there have been on-going efforts to become more efficient in all areas of the organization, the constantly changing environment continues to create new demands and resource pressures. The TSB has also embarked on an ambitious modernization agenda that requires significant investment over the coming year.
Another risk faced by the TSB is challenges to its credibility. With the advent of social media, the public/media want factual information on what happened within minutes/hours, and they expect regular progress reports throughout the investigations. Key stakeholders also want timely information for their own use within their Safety Management System (SMS) or programs, and litigants want timely information to file early lawsuits. If the TSB does not ensure the review and modernization of its enabling legislation, core investigation processes, quality assurance/control processes, and make use of modern technologies, there is a risk that questions could be raised about the TSB's processes, its continued relevance and its reputation.
The success of the TSB depends upon the expertise, professionalism and competence of its employees, so maintaining a qualified and healthy workforce remains a key risk. Challenges include recruiting and retaining experienced and qualified personnel in certain operational areas due to higher private sector salaries, a shortage of skilled workers for certain positions, and the on-going retirement of the baby-boomer cohort of employees. Another challenge is the need to be vigilant with respect to employee wellbeing. Due to the nature of the work performed by the TSB, employees may be exposed to significant workplace stress. Occupational health and safety is also important, in particular because of the risks associated with deployments to occurrence sites involving exposure to many hazards. Without a skilled and healthy workforce, the TSB would not be able to deliver its mandate and achieve its key strategic objectives.
Key risks
Risks | Mitigating strategy and effectiveness | Link to the department's Programs | Link to departmental priorities |
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The TSB's volume of activities is influenced by the number, severity and complexity of transportation occurrences, and the volume cannot effectively be predicted. This uncertainty poses certain challenges with respect to the planning and management of TSB resources. Changing government priorities and fiscal restraints over the past number of years have also had an impact on the TSB's resources and its ability to deal with a heavy workload. The reduced resource levels provide less flexibility to deal with concurrent workload demands. There is a high likelihood of a moderate impact on the TSB's ability to continue to effectively deliver its mandate and meet its obligations as a federal public service organization given limited financial resources, high public expectations, changing government priorities, and other external changes beyond the TSB's control. | The TSB will:
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Risks | Mitigating strategy and effectiveness | Link to the department's Programs | Link to departmental priorities |
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Historically, the TSB has worked quietly in the background taking the time required to conduct thorough investigations and shared information in its final investigation reports once the investigations were completed. However, expectations have changed considerably and people no longer want to wait for the completion of TSB investigations. The public/media want factual information on what happened within hours/days, and they expect progress reports on what we have found during the investigation. Key stakeholders want timely information for their own use within their Safety Management System programs. Litigants want timely information to file early lawsuits. The TSB must therefore adapt its business processes and share information more openly during the course of its investigations. Failure to do so could expose the TSB to challenges to its business processes due to the lack of transparency and limited sharing of information, which in turn could affect our reputation and credibility. There is a medium likelihood of the TSB's operational effectiveness and credibility being moderately impacted by a failure to adequately protect against the various types of challenges to the TSB's legislation, business processes and methodologies. | The TSB will:
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Risks | Mitigating strategy and effectiveness | Link to the department's Programs | Link to departmental priorities |
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The success of the TSB depends on the expertise, professionalism and competence of its employees. Many of the key positions at the TSB are "one deep" which means that there is only one person responsible for a specific task, with limited back-up. In addition, some of these key positions require strong combination of managerial and technical skills. Therefore, ineffective recruitment, development and/or retention of the TSB's workforce could pose a significant risk. There is a medium/low likelihood that the TSB will not be able to maintain a knowledgeable workforce which could result in a moderate negative impact on the TSB's reputation and/or ability to carry-out its mandate. | The TSB will continue to maintain its knowledge base and technical expertise through effective recruitment, training and development in order to mitigate this risk. The TSB Executive Committee will monitor staffing turnover, training and other relevant human resources statistics to monitor for possible workforce issues and implement corrective action as required. |
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Risks | Mitigating strategy and effectiveness | Link to the department's Programs | Link to departmental priorities |
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Ineffective safeguarding, retention and retrieval of information pose a risk to the achievement of the TSB mandate. The TSB's work is fundamentally reliant on the collection, retention, management and analysis of occurrence information. The TSB must therefore ensure that information is complete, accurate, appropriately stored and readily accessible to employees who need it when they need it. There is a medium/low likelihood that gaps in the safeguarding, retention and retrieval of information could have a moderate impact on the TSB's ability to deliver its mandate in a timely and effective manner. | The TSB will continue to enhance the processes, tools and technology in support of the management of its information resources to mitigate the risk of losing critical information and corporate knowledge. In particular the TSB will increase its monitoring of information management practices with respect to the classification, storage and retention of occurrence information with the objective of ensuring a consistent application. The TSB Executive Committee will review the department's annual results of Treasury Board Secretariat's Record Keeping Assessment Tool to monitor its progress. |
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Risks | Mitigating strategy and effectiveness | Link to the department's Programs | Link to departmental priorities |
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Due to the nature of the work performed by the TSB, employees may be subjected to workplace stress and emotional trauma. TSB investigators are regularly exposed to accident sites involving injury and death, as well as to direct interaction with distraught survivors and families of victims. The 2014 Public Service Employee Survey (PSES) results identified several areas where the workplace environment could be improved. Furthermore, despite the efforts made over the past few years, some risks remain with respect to employee occupational health and safety (OHS). There is a medium/low likelihood that continuing challenges related to workload, workplace environment and gaps in the occupational health and safety program could result in a moderate impact to the wellbeing of TSB employees. | The TSB is updating all key elements of the Occupational Health and Safety Program and Critical Incident Stress Management training has been delivered to all employees. The TSB has developed a PSES action plan to address workplace environment improvements. The TSB Executive Committee will monitor employee wellbeing indicators through semi-annual updates provided by Human Resources and the National OHS Policy Committee. Corrective action will be prioritized and actioned. |
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Results: what we achieved
Programs
Program 1.1 Aviation Occurrence Investigations
Description
The Aviation Occurrence Investigations program is governed by the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, the Transportation Safety Board Regulations, and Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Under this program, the TSB conducts independent investigations into selected aviation transportation occurrences in, or over Canada, and in certain circumstances internationally, to identify causes and contributing factors. This program includes the publication of investigation reports, the formulation and monitoring of recommendations and other safety communications, as well as the conduct of outreach activities to advocate for changes to operating practices, equipment, infrastructure, and legislation to advance transportation safety. The Aviation Occurrence Investigations program also includes the fulfillment of specific Government of Canada obligations related to transportation safety under conventions of the International Civil Aviation Organization and other international agreements.
Results
A total of 20 aviation investigations were started in 2016-17 (21 in 2015–16), and 20 investigations were completed in 2016-17 (19 in 2015-16). The average duration of all completed investigations was 656 days, a 20% increase from the 2015-16 average of 548 days. The percentage of investigations completed within the target time (75% in 450 days) decreased from 21% in 2015-16 to 15% in 2016-17. These results are due in part to efforts made to complete a backlog of older investigations, including two investigations initiated in 2013 and two investigations started in early 2014. If these four investigations are removed, the average time to complete air investigations was 560 days, which is more representative of the program's performance.
The TSB continues to face challenges in achieving its performance targets for the Aviation Occurrence Investigations program. In order to improve performance, a more structured and robust project management process was implemented in 2016-17, along with enhanced measures for tracking the progress of investigations. A greater emphasis is being placed on teamwork and the assignment of investigation tasks is done in a manner that better leverages all personnel across the country. Mandatory training will continue to be provided to all investigators and managers. Measurable progress towards the achievement of report timeliness targets is expected to be achieved by March 2018.
Limited progress was achieved in increasing the percentage of responses to recommendations assessed as fully satisfactory. Progress is very slow due to the systemic nature and complexity of some of the issues to be addressed, the complexity of the regulatory process, the need to harmonize standards with other countries, as well as a lack of buy-in from the regulators and industry stakeholders. In 2016-17, the status of only one of the 40 recommendations reassessed was changed to fully satisfactory. Progress made by Transport Canada in addressing TSB recommendations has been, and remains, very slow. This matter has been identified by the TSB as a key safety issue that needs to be addressed to make Canada's transportation system safer. As such, it was added to the 2016 TSB Watchlist. The Air Investigations Branch will continue to work closely with Transport Canada to address the outstanding recommendations, and seek to achieve more timely safety action.
In 2016, the accident rate for Canadian-registered aircraft was 4.5 accidents per 100,000 flying hours, a decrease from the previous year's accident rate of 5.2. There has been a significant downward trend in accident rates for Canadian-registered aircraft over the last 10 years. Similarly, the 2016 accident rate of 3.3 accidents per 100,000 aircraft movements continues to represent a significant downward trend over the same 10-year period. In 2016, 24 fatal accidents involved Canadian-registered aircraft other than ultra-lights, lower than the last ten-year average of 28. The number of fatalities (34) was also lower than the last ten-year average of 51.
The Aviation Occurrence Investigations program's spending was generally in line with the planned amounts. Some funds were lapsed to create a provision for the future payment of retroactive salary adjustments.
Expected results | Performance indicators | Target | Date to achieve target | 2016–17 Actual results | 2015–16 Actual results | 2014–15 Actual results |
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Aviation occurrence investigations are efficient | Average time for completing investigation reports | 450 days | March 31, 2018 | Not met: 656 days | Not met: 548 days | Not met: 546 days |
Percentage of investigations completed within the published target time | 65% | March 31, 2018 | Not met: 15% | Not met: 21% | Not met: 32% | |
Safety deficiencies in the aviation industry are addressed | Percentage of responses to recommendations assessed as Fully Satisfactory (since TSB's creation) | 65% | March 31, 2017 | Not met: 64% | Met: 67% | Not met: 62% |
Percentage of safety advisories on which safety actions have been taken | 60% | March 31, 2017 | Met: 100%Footnote 1 | Met: 100%Footnote 2 | Not met: 50% | |
Average time recommendations have been outstanding -active and dormant recommendations | 7 years | March 31, 2018 | Not met: 14.2 years | TBDFootnote 3 | - | |
Aviation transportation system is safer | Aviation accident rate (over 10-year period) | Continue downward trend in accident rate | March 31, 2017 | Met: There has been a significant downward trend in the accident rate for Canadian-registered aircraft over the past 10 years. The aviation accident rate in 2016 was 4.5 accidents per 100,000 hours flown, below the 10-year average of 5.7. |
Met: There has been a significant downward trend in the accident rate for Canadian-registered aircraft over the past 10 years. | - |
Number of fatal aviation accidents (over 10-year period) | Reduction in number of fatalities | March 31, 2017 | Met: The number of fatal accidents was 29, below the 10 year average of 33.9 and fatalities in 2016 totaled 45, lower than the 10-year average of 58. | Met: The number of fatal accidents and fatalities in 2015 was lower than the 10-year average. | - |
2016–17 Main Estimates |
2016–17 Planned spending |
2016–17 Total authorities available for use |
2016–17 Actual spending (authorities used) |
2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
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12,831,845 | 13,216,156 | 13,323,213 | 12,949,182 | (266,974) |
2016–17 Planned | 2016–17 Actual | 2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
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89 | 89 | 0 |
Program 1.2 Marine Occurrence Investigations
Description
The Marine Occurrence Investigations program is governed by the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, the Transportation Safety Board Regulations, and the Casualty Investigation Code of the International Maritime Organization. Under this program, the TSB conducts independent investigations into selected marine transportation occurrences in Canada, and in certain circumstances internationally to identify causes and contributing factors. This program includes the publication of investigation reports, the formulation and monitoring of recommendations and other safety communications, as well as the conduct of outreach activities to advocate for changes to operating practices, equipment, infrastructure, and legislation to advance transportation safety. The Marine Occurrence Investigations program also includes the fulfillment of specific Government of Canada's obligations related to transportation safety under conventions of the International Maritime Organization and other international agreements.
Results
A total of 13 marine investigations were started in 2016-17 (10 in 2015–16), and 7 investigations were completed in 2016-17 (15 in 2015-16). The average duration of completed investigations was 438 days, an increase from the 2015-16 average of 406 days, but below the target of 450 days. The percentage of investigations completed within the published target time dropped from 73% in 2015-16 to 43% in 2016-17. Due primarily to an increase in accidents and incidents last year, more work than usual was undertaken in 2016-17. A few larger and more complex investigations were also conducted in 2016-17.
The target for the "percentage of investigations completed within the published target time" will remain at 85% for 2017-18. However, given the workload, we are doubtful that we will be able to meet this target in that timeframe. Once the workload surge is dealt with, the TSB expects to fully meet this performance target in 2018-19.
The target for the "percentage of responses to recommendations assessed" as fully satisfactory was increased to 85% in 2014-15 in anticipation of Transport Canada's new Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations, which would address a number of outstanding TSB recommendations. Unfortunately, these regulations in their final form did not fully address the identified safety deficiencies. However, the number of fully satisfactory recommendations has increased in the past two years as other issues were addressed. We anticipate this trend to continue in 2017-18. Therefore, the target will remain the same, and the TSB will renew its efforts to encourage action on this key file.
The 2016 shipping accident rate for Canadian-flag commercial vessels was 2.7 accidents per 1,000 movements, down from the 10-year average of 3.0. There has been a significant downward trend in the accident rate for Canadian commercial non-fishing vessels over the past 10 years. Marine activity for foreign commercial non-fishing vessels decreased 3% from the 2006–2015 average, and the accident rate decreased to 1.0 accident per 1,000 movements from the ten-year average of 1.5.
The Marine Occurrence Investigations program's spending was generally in line with the planned amounts. Some funds were lapsed to create a provision for the future payment of retroactive salary adjustments.
Expected results | Performance indicators | Target | Date to achieve target | 2016–17 Actual results | 2015–16 Actual results | 2014–15 Actual results |
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Marine occurrence investigations are efficient | Average time for completing investigation reports | 450 days | March 31, 2017 | Exceeded: 438 days | Exceeded: 406 days | Exceeded: 435 days |
Percentage of investigations completed within the published target time | 85% | March 31, 2017 | Not met: 43% | Not met: 73% | Not met: 58% | |
Safety deficiencies in the marine industry are addressed | Percentage of responses to recommendations assessed as Fully Satisfactory (since TSB's creation) | 85% | March 31, 2017 | Met: 84%Footnote 5 | Surpassed: 87% | Mostly met: 83% |
Percentage of safety advisories on which safety actions have been taken | 60% | March 31, 2017 | Not met: 33% | Met: 60% | Not met: 43% | |
Average time recommendations have been outstanding (active and dormant recommendations) | 7 years | March 31, 2018 | Not met: 12.5 years | TBDFootnote 6 | - | |
Marine transportation system is safer | Marine accident rate (over 10-year period) | Reduction in accident rate | March 31, 2017 | Met: 2016 accident rates for Canadian flag commercial vessels, for foreign commercial non-fishing vessels, and for fishing vessels was lower than the 10 year averages. The marine accident rates in 2016 were: 2.7 accidents per 1,000 vessel movements for Canadian flag commercial vessels, below the 10-year average of 3.0. 1.0 accidents per 1,000 vessel movements for foreign commercial non-fishing vessels, below the 10-year average of 1.5. 6.2 accidents per 1,000 active fishing vessels, below the 10-year average of 6.7. |
Met: 2015 accident rates for Canadian flag commercial vessels, for foreign commercial non-fishing vessels, and for fishing vessels was lower than the 10 year averages. | - |
Number of fatal marine accidents (over 10-year period) | Reduction in number of fatalities | March 31,2017 | Met: The number of fatal accidents was 4, below the 10-year average of 13.7 and the number of fatalities in 2016 totaled 7, lower than the 10-year average of 17.5. | Met: The number of fatal accidents was lower than the 10-year average. However, the number of fatalities in 2015 was up slightly from the 10-year average. | - |
2016–17 Main Estimates |
2016–17 Planned spending |
2016–17 Total authorities available for use |
2016–17 Actual spending (authorities used) |
2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
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5,089,370 | 5,241,795 | 5,095,801 | 4,952,744 | (289,051) |
2016–17 Planned | 2016–17 Actual | 2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
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37 | 36 | (1) |
Program 1.3 Rail Occurrence Investigations
Description
The Rail Occurrence Investigations program is governed by the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act and the Transportation Safety Board Regulations. Under this program, the TSB conducts independent investigations into selected rail transportation occurrences in Canada to identify causes and contributing factors. This program includes the publication of investigation reports, the formulation and monitoring of recommendations and other safety communications, as well as the conduct of outreach activities to advocate for changes to operating practices, equipment, infrastructure, and legislation to advance transportation safety. The Rail Occurrence Investigations program also includes the provision of assistance, upon request, to the provinces for the investigation of short-line railway occurrences under provincial jurisdiction.
Results
A total of 12 rail investigations were started in 2016-17 and 17 investigations were completed. By comparison, 15 investigations were started in 2015-16 and 12 were completed. Fiscal year 2016-17 was again very challenging for the Rail Occurrence Investigations program. The high level of activity along with the public expectations that followed in the aftermath of a number of high profile crude oil train derailments, including Lac-Mégantic and Gogama, has now largely subsided. Although there was some improvement in report timeliness, the efficiency performance targets for this program were not achieved, partially due to the accumulated workload over the previous 2 years. If the three investigations started in 2014 are removed, the average time to complete rail investigations was 485 days, which is more representative of the program's performance. As the backlog of investigations files is addressed in 2017-18, additional improvements in these performance targets are expected.
Specific measures were implemented in 2016-17 to help address the challenges and to improve performance. A more structured and robust project management process was implemented. Additional training was provided to all investigators and managers relating to a number of investigation processes. Greater emphasis was placed on team work. The assignment of investigation tasks was done in a manner that better leveraged all personnel across the country.
One more recommendation became fully satisfactory in 2016-17. In addition, significant progress was achieved on the implementation of on-board voice and video recorders. However, continued efforts will be required to achieve progress on a number of other safety issues, including the implementation of additional physical defenses to prevent uncontrolled movements. The TSB must therefore continue to make compelling arguments that will influence the regulator and industry to take additional safety actions.
The main-track accident rate decreased to 2.8 accidents per million main-track train miles in 2016, down from 3.0 in 2015, but up from the ten-year average of 2.5. However, the number of fatalities in 2016 was 66, up from 46 in 2015, but down from the ten-year average of 78.
In fiscal year 2016-17, the Rail Occurrence Investigations program's spending was generally in line with the planned amounts. Some funds were lapsed to create a provision for the future payment of retroactive salary adjustments.
Expected results | Performance indicators | Target | Date to achieve target | 2016–17 Actual results | 2015–16 Actual results | 2014–15 Actual results |
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Rail occurrence investigations are efficient | Average time for completing investigation reports | 450 days | March 31, 2017 | Not met: 519 days | Not met: 525 days | Not met: 494 days |
Percentage of investigations completed within the published target time | 75% | March 31, 2018 | Not met: 29% | Not met: 25% | Not met: 31% | |
Safety deficiencies in the rail industry are addressed | Percentage of responses to recommendations assessed as Fully Satisfactory (since TSB's creation) | 89% | March 31, 2017 | Met: 88%Footnote 8 | Met: 88%Footnote 9 | Exceeded: 90% |
Percentage of safety advisories on which safety actions have been taken | 75% | March 31, 2017 | Not met: 50% 12 safety advisories were issued during the year |
Met: 75% | Exceeded: 85% 16 safety advisories were issued during the year |
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Average time recommendations have been outstanding (active and dormant recommendations) | 7 years | March 31, 2018 | Met: 6.3 years | TBDFootnote 10 | - | |
Rail transportation system is safer | Rail accident rate (over 10-year period) | Continue downward trend in accident rate | March 31, 2017 | Not met: The main-track accident rate in 2016 was 2.8 accidents per million main-track train miles, up from the 10-year average of 2.5. | Not met: The main-track accident rate in 2015 was 3.0 accidents per million main-track train miles, up from the ten-year average of 2.5. | - |
Number of fatal rail accidents (over 10-year period) | Reduction in number of fatalities | March 31, 2017 | Met: The number of fatal accidents in 2016 was 62, below the ten-year average of 70. Rail fatalities totaled 66 in 2016, lower than the 10-year average of 78. |
Met: The number of fatal accidents in 2015 was 46, down from the ten-year average of 75. Rail fatalities totaled 46 in 2015, down from the ten-year average of 84. |
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2016–17 Main Estimates |
2016–17 Planned spending |
2016–17 Total authorities available for use |
2016–17 Actual spending (authorities used) |
2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
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5,868,756 | 6,044,524 | 5,967,386 | 5,799,860 | (244,664) |
2016–17 Planned | 2016–17 Actual | 2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
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40 | 40 | 0 |
Program 1.4 Pipeline Occurrence Investigations
Description
The Pipeline Occurrence Investigations program is governed by the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act and the Transportation Safety Board Regulations. Under this program, the TSB conducts independent investigations into selected pipeline occurrences under federal jurisdiction within Canada to identify causes and contributing factors. This program includes the publication of investigation reports, the formulation and monitoring of recommendations and other safety communications, as well as the conduct of outreach activities to advocate for changes to operating practices, equipment, infrastructure, and legislation to advance transportation safety.
Results
In fiscal year 2016-17, no investigations were completed. This result was anticipated in the TSB's 2016-17 Report on Plans and Priorities. Two new pipeline investigations were started in 2016-17.
The on-line occurrence reporting system which was implemented in partnership with the National Energy Board in 2014 has continued to be an efficient mechanism for industry to report occurrences to both organizations through a single-window. In 2016-17, other specific measures were implemented to help improve performance. Additional pipeline investigation training was completed. The pipeline investigation processes were reviewed and updated. A number of outreach meetings with key pipeline industry stakeholders were conducted relating to the updated investigation processes. The TSB is now well-positioned to achieve the expected results and agreed upon targets for the Pipeline Occurrence Investigations program in future years.
At this time, there are no outstanding active Pipeline recommendations – all have been assessed as fully satisfactory. One safety advisory letter was issued in 2016-17.
There were no pipeline accidents in 2016, the same as in 2015, down from the ten-year average of 8. No fatal accidents occurred on a federally regulated pipeline system in 2016.
The Pipeline Occurrence Investigations program's spending was generally in line with the planned amounts.
Expected results | Performance indicators | Target | Date to achieve target | 2016–17 Actual results | 2015–16 Actual results | 2014–15 Actual results |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pipeline occurrence investigations are efficient | Average time for completing investigation reports | 450 days | March 31, 2018 | Not applicable | Not met: 650 | Not met: 665 days |
Percentage of investigations completed within the published target time | 100% | March 31, 2018 | Not applicable | Not met: 0% | Not met: 0% | |
Safety deficiencies in the pipeline industry are addressed | Percentage of responses to recommendations assessed as Fully Satisfactory (since TSB's creation) | 100% | All already achieved | Not applicable | Met: 100% | Met: 100% |
Percentage of safety advisories on which safety actions have been taken | 75% | March 31, 2017 | Met: 100% | Not applicable: No safety advisories issued | Not Applicable: No safety advisories were issued during the year | |
Average time recommendations have been outstanding - active and dormant recommendations | Not applicable* | Not applicable* | Not applicable | Not applicable: No outstanding recommenda-tions | - | |
Pipeline system is safer | Pipeline accident rate (over 10-year period) | Reduction in accident rate | March 31, 2017 | Met: The 2016 rate was 0 pipeline accidents per exajoule, below the 10-year average of 0.57. | Met: The 2015 rate was 0 pipeline accidents per exajoule, down from the ten year average of 0.6. | - |
Number of fatal pipeline accidents (over 10-year period) | No fatalities | March 31, 2017 | Met: There have been no fatal accidents. | Met: There have been no fatal accidents. | - |
* There are no outstanding recommendations.
2016–17 Main Estimates |
2016–17 Planned spending |
2016–17 Total authorities available for use |
2016–17 Actual spending (authorities used) |
2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
---|---|---|---|---|
277,784 | 286,104 | 296,124 | 287,811 | 1,707 |
2016–17 Planned | 2016–17 Actual | 2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
---|---|---|
3 | 3 | 0 |
Internal Services
Description
Internal Services are those groups of related activities and resources that the federal government considers to be services in support of programs and/or required to meet corporate obligations of an organization. Internal Services refers to the activities and resources of the 10 distinct service categories that support Program delivery in the organization, regardless of the Internal Services delivery model in a department. The 10 service categories are: Management and Oversight Services; Communications Services; Legal Services; Human Resources Management Services; Financial Management Services; Information Management Services; Information Technology Services; Real Property Services; Materiel Services; and Acquisition Services.
Results
In 2016-17, the Internal Services program continued to effectively deliver services in support of the four investigation programs and corporate obligations. A new 5 year Strategic Plan was published with a major focus being placed on the modernization of the TSB and the way it conducts its work.
Implementation of various initiatives in response to the results of the 2014 Public Service Employee Survey was completed. Work continued on implementation of the Open Government initiative and additional data elements were added to datasets available on the web. Continuous improvement measures were implemented with respect to Information Management, records disposition procedures were updated, and awareness training was provided.
During 2016-17, a new Time Reporting System was developed and implemented to enable the TSB to track time spent on its activities and facilitate the linkage of resources utilized to the results achieved. Work also progressed on the development of the Electronic Occurrence Notification Systems (EONS) and the updated Pipeline occurrence database which will be deployed in 2017-18.
The Finance division worked effectively with the HR division and PSPC compensation personnel to ensure that Phoenix issues were minimized and ensure that employees were paid in a timely manner. Where appropriate cash advances were issued to employees.
A peer mentoring program was established for new employees that joined the department during the year.
The utilization of human resources for Internal Services was lower than planned due to vacancies in some positions. Spending was however higher than planned due to the replacement of outdated IT equipment as per the TSB IT equipment useful life schedule that was developed this fiscal year.
2016–17 Main Estimates |
2016–17 Planned spending |
2016–17 Total authorities available for use |
2016–17 Actual spending (authorities used) |
2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
---|---|---|---|---|
5,720,897 | 5,892,236 | 6,176,546 | 6,003,148 | 110,912 |
2016–17 Planned | 2016–17 Actual | 2016–17 Difference (actual minus planned) |
---|---|---|
51 | 46 | (5) |
Analysis of trends in spending and human resources
Actual expenditures
Departmental spending trend graph
Departmental spending trend graph - Details
2014-15 | 2015-16 | 2016-17 | 2017-18 | 2018-19 | 2019-20 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Sunset Programs - Anticipated | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Statutory | 3,564 | 3,458 | 3,395 | 3,249 | 3,214 | 3,214 |
Voted | 28,655 | 26,575 | 26,598 | 26,847 | 26,171 | 26,171 |
Total | 32,219 | 30,033 | 29,993 | 30,096 | 29,385 | 29,385 |
The 2014-15 to 2016-17 actual spending presented above are actual expenditures as presented in the Public Accounts of Canada.
Fiscal year 2016-17 spending is consistent with the previous year's spending. Higher spending in 2014-15 was due to the following factors:
- Investigation of rail accident in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec incremental spending ($0.3 million);
- Payouts for the liquidation of accumulated severance benefits as per the last round of signed collective agreements ($0.4 million);
- Transition charge for the conversion of employee payroll to salary in arrears implemented by the Government of Canada ($0.7 million); and
- Purchase of an X-Ray Computed Tomography System ($0.6 million).
In 2016-17, there was no major spending on occurrence investigations or any other operational areas during the fiscal year. For 2017-18 and onward, it is anticipated that spending will increase due to the recent signing of new collective agreements. As a result, the department is expected to incur increased expenditures for retroactive and current salary increases during the 2017-18 and later fiscal years. It is important to note that these increases in spending are not accounted for in the graph or financial tables as the amounts cannot be accurately predicted at the time of DRR production.
Programs and Internal Services | 2016–17 Main Estimates |
2016–17 Planned spending |
2017–18 Planned spending |
2018–19 Planned spending |
2016–17 Total authorities available for use | 2016–17 Actual spending (authorities used) |
2015–16 Actual spending (authorities used) | 2014–15 Actual spending (authorities used) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Aviation Occurrence Investigations | 12,831,845 | 13,216,156 | 12,691,485 | 12,341,560 | 13,323,213 | 12,949,182 | 13,142,640 | 14,990,356 |
Marine Occurrence Investigations | 5,089,370 | 5,241,795 | 5,373,229 | 5,289,240 | 5,095,801 | 4,952,744 | 5,164,231 | 4,934,356 |
Rail Occurrence Investigations | 5,868,756 | 6,044,524 | 6,032,315 | 5,876,933 | 5,967,386 | 5,799,860 | 5,746,426 | 6,146,776 |
Pipeline Occurrence Investigations | 277,784 | 286,104 | 280,649 | 293,847 | 296,124 | 287,811 | 307,128 | 283,717 |
Subtotal | 24,067,755 | 24,788,579 | 24,377,678 | 23,801,580 | 24,682,524 | 23,989,597 | 24,360,425 | 26,355,205 |
Internal Services | 5,720,897 | 5,892,236 | 5,718,221 | 5,583,087 | 6,176,546 | 6,003,148 | 5,672,065 | 5,864,126 |
Total | 29,788,652 | 30,680,815 | 30,095,899 | 29,384,667 | 30,859,070 | 29,992,745 | 30,032,490 | 32,219,331 |
The TSB is financed by the Government of Canada through Parliamentary authorities. Total authorities available for use is comprised of 2016-17 Main Estimates amounts as well as the amount from the carry forward of unused funding from 2015-16. The small difference in 2016-17 forecast spending compared to authorities available for use is due to a higher carry forward amount from 2015-16 offset by lower Employee Benefit Plans.
The 2016-17 Main Estimates and planned spending by program was based on forecasted amounts as well as active investigations in each mode at the time of the planning period. Actual spending can vary depending on actual program activities (e.g. actual number of occurrences in each mode during the year) and other costs incurred during the fiscal year (e.g. changes in staffing levels), which explains the relative differences in 2016-17 planned and actual spending between programs.
Over the past few years, the TSB has reduced its overall spending in order to generate carry forward funding to cover retroactive payments for the new collective agreements, which will have to be paid to employees once these agreements are approved. These payments are for 2014-15 and 2015-16 salary increments, which departments are required to fund from their existing authorities due to the Budget 2014 operating budget freeze. As a result of the reduced spending, the TSB did not need to request its entitlement for additional authorities related to salary-related expenditures (severance and parental benefits) or its entitlement to terminable allowance funding for certain employment groups, as it anticipated having a lapse under its operating vote in 2016-17. The resulting carry forward is estimated at $1,309,114 for the 2017-18 fiscal year.
Actual human resources
Programs and Internal Services | 2014–15 Actual |
2015–16 Actual |
2016–17 Forecast |
2016–17 Actual | 2017–18 Planned | 2018–19 Planned |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Aviation Occurrence Investigations | 87 | 90 | 89 | 89 | 89 | 89 |
Marine Occurrence Investigations | 36 | 35 | 37 | 36 | 37 | 37 |
Rail Occurrence Investigations | 39 | 37 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
Pipeline Occurrence Investigations | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Subtotal | 164 | 164 | 169 | 168 | 169 | 169 |
Internal Services | 44 | 45 | 51 | 46 | 51 | 51 |
Total | 208 | 209 | 220 | 214 | 220 | 220 |
No major fluctuations in full-time equivalents (FTE) have occurred or are expected to occur in the upcoming fiscal years. FTE distribution between programs is relatively consistent over the years.
Expenditures by vote
For information on the TSB's organizational voted and statutory expenditures, consult the Public Accounts of Canada 2017.Footnote ii
Alignment of spending with the whole-of-government framework
Program | Spending area | Government of Canada activity | 2016–17 Actual spending |
---|---|---|---|
1.1 Aviation Occurrence Investigations | Social Affairs | Safety and Security | 12,949,182 |
1.2 Marine Occurrence Investigations | Social Affairs | Safety and Security | 4,952,744 |
1.3 Rail Occurrence Investigations | Social Affairs | Safety and Security | 5,799,860 |
1.4 Pipeline Occurrence Investigations | Social Affairs | Safety and Security | 287,811 |
Spending area | Total planned spending | Total actual spending |
---|---|---|
Social affairs | 30,680,815 | 29,992,745 |
Financial statements and financial statements highlights
Financial statements
The TSB's financial statements [unaudited] for the year ended March 31, 2017, are available on the TSB's website.Footnote iv
Financial statements highlights
Financial information | 2016–17 Planned results |
2016–17 Actual |
2015–16 Actual |
Difference (2016–17 actual minus 2016–17 planned) | Difference (2016–17 actual minus 2015–16 actual) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total expenses | 36,112 | 35,375 | 35,095 | (737) | 280 |
Total revenues | 35 | 73 | 37 | 38 | 36 |
Net cost of operations before government funding and transfers | 36,077 | 35,302 | 35,058 | (775) | 244 |
The 2016–17 Planned Results are based on estimates known at the time of the Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP). The difference between total expenses for 2016–17 Planned Results and 2016–17 Actual is mainly due to events not known during the RPP planning phase. Planned expenses for 2016-17 were estimated at $36.1 million while actual expenses are slightly lower at $35.4 million.
On an accrual accounting basis, TSB total operating expenses for 2016-17 are $35.4 million, a slight increase of $0.3 million (0.8%) when compared to the previous fiscal year. There was no significant variance in any of the categories of expenses.
The TSB's revenues are incidental and result from cost recovery activities from training or investigation activities, proceeds from the disposal of assets that are no longer being used, and fees generated by requests under the Access to Information Act.
Financial Information | 2016–17 | 2015–16 | Difference (2016–17 minus 2015–16) |
---|---|---|---|
Total net liabilities | 6,015 | 5,595 | 420 |
Total net financial assets | 2,226 | 2,661 | (435) |
Departmental net debt | 3,789 | 2,934 | 855 |
Total non-financial assets | 4,966 | 5,355 | (389) |
Departmental net financial position | 1,177 | 2,421 | (1,244) |
The TSB's total net liabilities consist primarily of accounts payable and accrued liabilities relating to operations which account for $3.4 million and 57% (53% in 2015-16) of total liabilities. The liability for employee future benefits pertaining to severance pay represents $1.1 million and 18% (27% in 2015-16) of total liabilities, while the liability for vacation pay and compensatory leave accumulated by employees but not taken at year-end represents $1.5 million and 25% (20% in 2015-16). The $0.4 million increase in accounts payable and accrued liabilities between years is mainly attributed to the provision for retroactive salary increases. The $0.4 million decrease in liability for employee future benefits pertaining to severance pay is from the decrease in the severance rate benefit provision from 7.51% to 5.69% while the liability for vacation pay and compensatory leave increased by $0.4 million partially due to deferring the mandatory March 31, 2017 payout to fiscal year 2017-18.
Total net financial assets consist of accounts receivable, advances, and amounts due from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) of the Government of Canada. The amount due from the CRF represents 86% or $1.9 million (96% in 2015-16) of the year-end balance, a decrease of $0.6 million. This represents a drop in the amount of net cash that the TSB is entitled to draw from the CRF in the future to discharge its current liabilities, without further appropriations. The amount and composition of TSB's net financial assets have decreased by $0.4 million between years due to the combination of lower amount due from the CRF of $0.6 million and higher other government receivables of $0.2 million attributed to the amount owed by the Treasury Board Secretariat for Employee Benefit Plan adjustments.
Total non-financial assets consist primarily of tangible capital assets, which makes up $4.8 million or 97% of the balance (97% in 2015-16), with inventory and prepaid expense accounting for the remainder. The decrease of $0.4M in non-financial assets between years is due to the annual amortization of assets ($1.1 million) which is offset in part by the acquisition of new assets ($0.7 million).
Supplementary information
Corporate information
Organizational profile
Appropriate minister: The Honourable Karina Gould
Institutional head: Kathleen Fox
Ministerial portfolio: Privy Council
Enabling instrument[s]: Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act,Footnote v S.C. 1989, c. 3
Year of incorporation / commencement: 1990
Reporting framework
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada's Strategic Outcome and Program Alignment Architecture of record for 2016–17 are shown below.
- Strategic Outcome: Independent investigations into transportation occurrences contribute to making the transportation system safer.
- 1.1 Program: Aviation Occurrence Investigations
- 1.2 Program: Marine Occurrence Investigations
- 1.3 Program: Rail Occurrence Investigations
- 1.4 Program: Pipeline Occurrence Investigations
- Internal Services
Supplementary information tables
The following supplementary information tables are available on the TSB's website:
Organizational contact information
Additional information about the Transportation Safety Board of Canada and its activities is available on the TSB websiteFootnote vi or by contacting us at:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Place du Centre
200 Promenade du Portage, 4th Floor
Gatineau, Quebec K1A 1K8
E-mail: communications@tsb.gc.ca
Social media: socialmedia-mediassociaux@tsb.gc.ca
Toll Free: 1-800-387-3557
Appendix: Definitions
- appropriation (crédit):
- Any authority of Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
- budgetary expenditures (dépenses budgétaires):
- Operating and capital expenditures; transfer payments to other levels of government, organizations or individuals; and payments to Crown corporations.
- Core Responsibility (responsabilité essentielle):
- An enduring function or role performed by a department. The intentions of the department with respect to a Core Responsibility are reflected in one or more related Departmental Results that the department seeks to contribute to or influence.
- Departmental Plan (Plan ministériel):
- Provides information on the plans and expected performance of appropriated departments over a three year period. Departmental Plans are tabled in Parliament each spring.
- Departmental Result (résultat ministériel):
- A Departmental Result represents the change or changes that the department seeks to influence. A Departmental Result is often outside departments' immediate control, but it should be influenced by program-level outcomes.
- Departmental Result Indicator (indicateur de résultat ministériel) :
- A factor or variable that provides a valid and reliable means to measure or describe progress on a Departmental Result.
- Departmental Results Framework (cadre ministériel des résultats) :
- Consists of the department's Core Responsibilities, Departmental Results and Departmental Result Indicators.
- Departmental Results Report (Rapport sur les résultats ministériels):
- Provides information on the actual accomplishments against the plans, priorities and expected results set out in the corresponding Departmental Plan.
- Evaluation (évaluation):
- In the Government of Canada, the systematic and neutral collection and analysis of evidence to judge merit, worth or value. Evaluation informs decision making, improvements, innovation and accountability. Evaluations typically focus on programs, policies and priorities and examine questions related to relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. Depending on user needs, however, evaluations can also examine other units, themes and issues, including alternatives to existing interventions. Evaluations generally employ social science research methods.
- full time equivalent (équivalent temps plein):
- A measure of the extent to which an employee represents a full person year charge against a departmental budget. Full time equivalents are calculated as a ratio of assigned hours of work to scheduled hours of work. Scheduled hours of work are set out in collective agreements.
- government-wide priorities (priorités pangouvernementales):
- For the purpose of the 2017–18 Departmental Plan, government-wide priorities refers to those high-level themes outlining the government's agenda in the 2015 Speech from the Throne, namely: Growth for the Middle Class; Open and Transparent Government; A Clean Environment and a Strong Economy; Diversity is Canada's Strength; and Security and Opportunity.
- horizontal initiatives (initiative horizontale):
- An initiative where two or more federal organizations, through an approved funding agreement, work toward achieving clearly defined shared outcomes, and which has been designated (for example, by Cabinet or a central agency) as a horizontal initiative for managing and reporting purposes.
- Management, Resources and Results Structure (Structure de la gestion, des ressources et des résultats):
- A comprehensive framework that consists of an organization's inventory of programs, resources, results, performance indicators and governance information. Programs and results are depicted in their hierarchical relationship to each other and to the Strategic Outcome(s) to which they contribute. The Management, Resources and Results Structure is developed from the Program Alignment Architecture.
- non budgetary expenditures (dépenses non budgétaires):
- Net outlays and receipts related to loans, investments and advances, which change the composition of the financial assets of the Government of Canada.
- performance (rendement):
- What an organization did with its resources to achieve its results, how well those results compare to what the organization intended to achieve, and how well lessons learned have been identified.
- performance indicator (indicateur de rendement):
- A qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or outcome, with the intention of gauging the performance of an organization, program, policy or initiative respecting expected results.
- performance reporting (production de rapports sur le rendement):
- The process of communicating evidence based performance information. Performance reporting supports decision making, accountability and transparency.
- planned spending (dépenses prévues):
- For Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports, planned spending refers to those amounts that receive Treasury Board approval by February 1. Therefore, planned spending may include amounts incremental to planned expenditures presented in the Main Estimates.
A department is expected to be aware of the authorities that it has sought and received. The determination of planned spending is a departmental responsibility, and departments must be able to defend the expenditure and accrual numbers presented in their Departmental Plans and Departmental Results Reports. - plans (plan):
- The articulation of strategic choices, which provides information on how an organization intends to achieve its priorities and associated results. Generally a plan will explain the logic behind the strategies chosen and tend to focus on actions that lead up to the expected result.
- priorities (priorité):
- Plans or projects that an organization has chosen to focus and report on during the planning period. Priorities represent the things that are most important or what must be done first to support the achievement of the desired Strategic Outcome(s).
- program (programme):
- A group of related resource inputs and activities that are managed to meet specific needs and to achieve intended results and that are treated as a budgetary unit.
- Program Alignment Architecture (architecture d’alignement des programmes):
- A structured inventory of an organization's programs depicting the hierarchical relationship between programs and the Strategic Outcome(s) to which they contribute.
- results (résultat):
- An external consequence attributed, in part, to an organization, policy, program or initiative. Results are not within the control of a single organization, policy, program or initiative; instead they are within the area of the organization's influence.
- statutory expenditures (dépenses législatives):
- Expenditures that Parliament has approved through legislation other than appropriation acts. The legislation sets out the purpose of the expenditures and the terms and conditions under which they may be made.
- Strategic Outcome (résultat stratégique):
- A long term and enduring benefit to Canadians that is linked to the organization's mandate, vision and core functions.
- sunset program (programme temporisé):
- A time limited program that does not have an ongoing funding and policy authority. When the program is set to expire, a decision must be made whether to continue the program. In the case of a renewal, the decision specifies the scope, funding level and duration.
- target (cible):
- A measurable performance or success level that an organization, program or initiative plans to achieve within a specified time period. Targets can be either quantitative or qualitative.
- voted expenditures (dépenses votées):
- Expenditures that Parliament approves annually through an Appropriation Act. The Vote wording becomes the governing conditions under which these expenditures may be made.